Abstract. We consider concurrent stochastic games played on graphs with reachability and safety objectives. These games can be solved by value iteration as well as strategy iteration, each of them yielding a sequence of under-approximations of the reachability value and a sequence of over-approximation of the safety value, converging to it in the limit. For both approaches, we provide the first (anytime) algorithms with stopping criteria. The stopping criterion for value iteration is based on providing a convergent sequence of over-approximations, which then allows to estimate the distance to the true value. For strategy iteration, we bound the error by complementing the strategy iteration algorithm for reachability by a new strategy iteration algorithm under-approximating the safety-value.
Introduction
A concurrent stochastic game [10] is a two-player game played on a graph. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently chooses a move. The moves then jointly determine the transition taken, which leads to a probability distribution over states. We consider safety and reachability objectives [10] . Considering a safety objective for player S , its goal is to maximize the probability of staying within a given set of states, while player R maximizes the probability to leave this set, which is its reachability objective. Hence, the two objectives are dual, the games are symmetric by swapping the players and thus, from now on we refer to both simply as concurrent games (CG). These games are determined [14] , i.e. the supremum probability which player S can ensure for staying in the safe set is equal to one minus the supremum probability which player R can ensure for reaching a state outside. Deciding whether this value is at least p for p ∈ [0, 1] is in PSPACE [13] . For the reachability objective, player R is only guaranteed the existence of ǫ-optimal (memoryless randomized) strategies [14] . For player S , optimal (again memoryless randomized) strategies exist [19] .
Algorithms for concurrent reachability games have been further studied and their termination discussed in [4, 3, 6] . The algorithms for solving the games are based on dynamic programming, namely value iteration (VI) and strategy iteration (SI):
Firstly, VI produces a non-decreasing sequence that under-approximates the optimal probability to reach the given states and in the limit converges to it [11] . However, no stopping criterion is known for this process. Hence, the current error cannot be bounded at a given moment. Although this sequence yields by determinacy an over-approximation for the value of the safety objective, there are no known sequences over-approximating the reachability value or dually underapproximating the safety value that would converge to the actual values. Our first contribution is an algorithm producing such a sequence, thus yielding the first stopping criterion for VI for these games and an anytime VI algorithm, which at any moment can bound the current imprecision in the approximation, converging to 0. Indeed, whenever the under-and over-approximations are less than ǫ apart, for ǫ > 0, they are also ǫ-close to the actual value of the game.
Secondly, SI produces a sequence of strategies guaranteeing non-decreasing probabilities to reach the given states, converging in the limit to the ǫ-optimum. SI can thus provide under-approximating sequence for reachability. However, similarly to VI, the known approaches only work for reachability and not for safety. Our second contribution is an SI algorithm, which converges to the safetyvalue from below. Again, this yields a stopping criterion for SI and an anytime SI algorithm.
Our Approach As mentioned above, the over-approximations coming from known VI algorithms for reachability as well as the under-approximations coming from known SI algorithms for safety [3] are not converging to the true value of the game [6] . The reason for this is the presence of so-called end components (EC) [8] .
In technical terms, due to ECs the greatest fixpoint of the VI operator (also called Bellman update) is different from the least one. While the over-approximations converge to the greatest fixpoint, the true value is the least fixpoint. This problem actually exists even for the much simpler single-player case of Markov decision processes (MDP) [20] .
For MDP, this issue has been solved by collapsing each EC into a single state, effectively erasing indefinite cycles [2, 15] . This prevents states of an EC to rely on each other's unsubstantiated overly high estimate of the value, reduces their estimate at once to that of the actions leaving the EC, causing all the fixpoints to coincide. This has been observed insufficient [16] for simple stochastic games (SSG) [7] , i.e. "turn-based" CG where in each state only one player has a non-trivial choice. As opposed to MDP, states of the same EC in an SSG may have different values, hence, cannot be all collapsed and their estimates reduced to the same value. Instead, [16] proposes to gradually deflate (decrease) each estimate whenever it is not substantiated by a move with that estimate leaving the EC (with positive probability). Since there are different leaving moves with different values, this gives rise to different parts of an EC called simple EC, each corresponding to a sphere of influence of each leaving move with potentially different values.
In our setting, the main challenge is to find the analogue to the simple EC and how to deflate them in the right way. In [16] , ECs are set of states such that there exists a set of moves, which only lead to states inside the EC, but still, for any two states in the EC, there exists a finite path between them only taking transitions labeled with the given moves. This definition of ECs reveals already one big obstacle when it comes to CG: The set of states, which transitions with a given move lead to, depends on the other player's simultaneous and independent choice. Hence, the given definition of EC does not prove to be suitable in our setting. Instead, a matrix game has to be solved repetitively for each state to determine the best distribution over available moves. In this matrix game, we have to face another issue, namely that an extremum over all strategies leaving an EC with a positive (arbitrary small) probability may be realized only by an optimal strategy that is leaving with zero probability, i.e. not leaving at all. For instance, consider Fig. 2 , for ǫ → 0, the strategy, which assigns ǫ to move b and (1 − ǫ) to move a yields an increasingly better value for the matrix game at s 1 with respect to strategies assigning a positive probability to states outside the EC. The supremum of this sequence is 1, however the strategy achieving it is not exiting anymore. Once the matrix game is solved, the sphere of influence of a leaving convex combination of moves can be computed by the classical attractor construction, yielding the desired analogue of the simple EC. This can then be finally deflated according to our notion of the best value when leaving the EC. Finally, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, we adapt such a parallel under-/over-approximating VI approach to SI on CG.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
-We introduce a VI algorithm yielding both under-and over-approximation sequences, both of which converge to the value of the game. Thus, we present the first stopping criterion for VI on CG and the first anytime algorithm with guaranteed precision. -We introduce an SI algorithm for safety strategies in CG. Since these results in both under-and over-approximation sequences for both objectives, we analogously obtain the first stopping criterion for SI on CG and the first anytime algorithm with guaranteed precision. -As direct consequences, we obtain (i) that for CG without non-trivial end components, the simpler solution (without deflating), is sufficient, and (ii) an SI algorithm for safety SSG that is simpler than Algorithm 2 in [6] , which needs to transform the game.
Further Related Work The PSPACE-algorithm given in [13] to decide whether the value of a given recursive game is at least p for p ∈ [0, 1] allows for a trivial stopping criterion by iteratively executing this algorithm for a suitable sequence of (p i ) i∈N (intuitively, we try to choose p i such at alternatingly, the value of the game is above and below the true value, while the distance between to succeeding p i monotonically decreases). However, this criterion is impractical since it definitely need exponential time. The following stopping criteria we present allow for a potentially fast approximation. The idea of complementing the under-approximating sequence of VI by an over-approximating one dates back to [18] as bounded VI (due to the new upper bound). It does not converge for general MDP, but in fact only for MDP without ECs as often considered in the stochastic shortest path problem. The convergence is ensured in [2, 15] by collapsing ECs, in [2] on the fly, in [15] as a preprocessing step, calling it interval iteration.
The first practical stopping criterion for SI in SSG ((but not for CG)) is given in [6] . To this end, an SI algorithm for safety strategies is given, which relies on a repetitive transformation of the underlying game. That the given algorithm does not work properly for concurrent stochastic games has been observed in [6] , correcting the claims of [3] . Further, this approach is claimed not extensible to VI. The first VI stopping criterion in SSG is obtained in [16] , which we extend here to CG.
A generalization of CG to ω-regular objectives has been considered in [9] . Value iteration via quantitative game µ-calculus has been discussed in [11] . As to tool support, the only model checker for CG is PRISM-games [17]. Model checking implementations for MDP that take stopping criteria into account are extensions of PRISM [1] and Storm [12, 21] .
Stochastic Games
In this section, we recall basic notions related to stochastic games. For a countable set X, a function µ :
The set of all distributions over X is denoted by µ(X). If there is a unique x ∈ X such that µ(x) = 1, we call the distribution Dirac and denote it by δ x .
Definition 1 ((Two-Player Stochastic) Concurrent Game).
A concurrent game is a tuple G = (S, M, Γ R , Γ S , T), where S is a finite set of states, M is a finite set of moves, Γ R , Γ S : S → 2 M \ ∅ are two move assignments and T : S × M × M → µ(S) is a transition function. For p ∈ {R , S }, assignment Γ p associates each state s ∈ S with a nonempty set Γ p (s) ⊆ M of moves available to player p at state s. T s, m R , m S s ′ gives the probability of a transition from state s to state s ′ when player R chooses move m R ∈ Γ R (s) and player S move m S ∈ Γ S (s).
A concurrent game is turn-based if for every state s there exists p ∈ {R , S } such that |Γ p (s)| = 1; then we call it a turn-based game, rather than a turnbased concurrent game. A play π of G is an infinite sequence s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · of states such that for all i ∈ N there are moves m
We denote by Play(G) the set of all plays and by Play s (G) the set of all plays s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · such that s 0 = s. A strategy for player p is a function ρ p : S → µ(M) that assigns to each state a distribution over moves available to player p, 1 i.e. for all s ∈ S, we have Supp(ρ(s)) ⊆ Γ p (s). We call a strategy pure if all distributions it returns are Dirac. In the following, we denote by R the set of strategies for player R and by S the set of strategies for player S . In addition, we use ρ to denote a single strategy of player R and σ to denote a single strategy of player S .
Semantics. Given two strategies ρ and σ and a starting state s 0 , we give the concurrent game the standard semantics in terms of a Markov chain with the same state space S, the initial state s 0 , and the transition probabilities P given by
We denote by P ρ,σ s 0 the standard probability measure over the plays induced by this Markov chain and define this to be the probability measure over plays of the game when player R plays strategy ρ, player S plays strategy σ and the game starts in state s 0 .
Reachability and Safety Objectives. Let Safe, Reach ⊆ S form a partitioning of S. Reach denotes the set of states player R wants to reach, while Safe denotes the set of states player S wants to confine the game in. We denote the reachability objective by ♦Reach := {s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · | ∃i ∈ N : s i ∈ Reach} and the safety objective by Safe := {s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · | ∀i ∈ N : s i ∈ Safe}. The value of the objective ♦Reach at state s is given by Additionally, we define the value given a fixed strategy as val R :ρ (♦Reach)(s) := inf σ∈S P ρ,σ s ♦Reach and val S :σ ( Safe)(s) := inf ρ∈R P σ,ρ s Safe . By the determinacy of these games [14] and the duality of these objectives, we have val R (♦Reach)(s) + val S ( Safe)(s) = 1 (since Reach and Safe partition the state space).
Let s ∈ S, m R ∈ Γ R (s) and m S ∈ Γ S (s). We denote the set of potential successors of s by Post(s, m R , m S ) = Supp(T s, m R , m S ). In addition, we lift the notation to strategies ρ and σ by
We denote by W S := {s | s ∈ S∧val(♦Reach)(s) = 0} the sure winning region of player S . It can be computed in at most |S|-steps by iteration W 0 S := S\Reach and
. Consequently, we can assume without loss of generality that Reach and W S are both singletons and absorbing.
End Components. Let G = (S, M, Γ R , Γ S , T) be a concurrent game. A nonempty set of states C ⊆ S is an end component if -there exist a player R strategy ρ and a player S strategy σ such that for each s ∈ C, we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ C, and -for every pair of states s, s ′ ∈ C there is a play s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · such that s 0 = s and s n = s ′ for some n, and for all 0 ≤ i < n, we have s i ∈ C and it holds s i+1 ∈ Post(s i , ρ, σ).
We call an end component C maximal if there exists no end component C ′ such that C C ′ and trivial if |C| = 1. 
Value Iteration
We can computed the expected value at a state s for a given valuation υ and strategies ρ and σ by
Lower Bound.
For the rest of this section, we consider reachability games, where player R tries to maximize the value. In Fig. 1 , one can find a concurrent game, which was originally presented in [5] . For this section, we set Reach = {s 2 } and Safe = {s 0 , s 1 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 } and let a, b be moves of player R and c, d moves of player S . Hence, in Fig. 1 , W S = {s 2 }, which is absorbing. [11] presents value iteration from below. We define a slightly simplified version also used in [5] . In the following, we denote by L k the k-th iteration of value iteration from below, where L k is defined as follows: Fig. 1 . A concurrent game, originally presented in [5] .
denotes a move if a player only has one available move in a state.
Since Reach is absorbing, we have
To compute a monotonically increasing sequence of valuations, we iterative apply the operator Pre to the lower bound. Computing The following theorem states that sequentially updating the value of the states of a game by solving one-shot matrix games at every state finally converges to the true reachability value.
Please note that the limit of L k may not be reached in finitely many steps since the value may be irrational [11] .
Upper Bound.
Value iteration from below converges to the value, but at any point in time we do not know how close we are to the value. To obtain a stopping criterion, we devise an algorithm approximatingn the value from above. The distance between the under-and the over-approximation in a state is then the distance we have at most to the true value.
Naïve Definition Naïvely, one could define an upper bound iteration as follows:
For CGs, this iteration is a valid over-approximation, but only for CGs without ECs, the iteration indeed monotonically converges to the reachability value from above, which is formalized in Theorem 2.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 2. Intuitively, the over-approximation will be updated from Reach and W S backwards to the states with increasing distance from Reach and W S . In EC-free games, it cannot happen that a set of states solely depends on each other to determine the value. Hence, the updates emerging from the correct values of Reach and W S will finally influence the value of all states. We prove the correctness of this approach by first proving that U k+1 ≤ U k for every k ∈ N by a simple induction over k, which also relies on Pre being monotonic over valuations. In addition, we prove that val(♦Reach) ≤ U k for all k ∈ N. With an argument similar to the proof of Fixpoint Kleene's Theorem, we show that lim k→∞ U k = U * exists and Pre R (U * ) = U * . This suffices to prove that
In the presence of non-trivial ECs the above theorem does not hold since there is no unique fixpoint to the Bellman equations. Example 1. In Fig. 2 , U 0 assigns 1 to both s 1 and s 2 . We have
for k ∈ N since the strategy, which assigns probability 1 to move a yields the supremum for Pre R (U k )(s 1 ) and Pre R (U k )(s 2 ). However, such a strategy yields effectively reachability value 0 for both states.
Bounded Value Iteration. Before we present how to overcome the issues of the naïve upper bound iteration, We briefly present the overall bounded value iteration algorithm. The goal finally is to define a method DEFLATE such that the algorithm in Algorithm 1 yields a monotonically decreasing sequence of valuations over-approximating the reachability value and converging to it in the limit, which is summerized in Theorem 3.
Algorithm 1 depicts bounded value iteration, i.e. the parallel computation of the upper and lower bound to bound the distance to the true value. If these approximations are closer than ǫ, we know that both approximations are at most ǫ-away from the real value.
Theorem 3 (Optimality of Upper Bound).
Algorithm 1 Bounded Value Iteration for Concurrent Games
repeat 5:
for C ∈ M do 8:
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3. To formally prove the claim, we show that DE-FLATE is also monotone. Then, we can show that U k+1 ≤ U k for all k ∈ N. The rest of the proof does not differ from the proof for games without non-trivial end components, i.e. we show that U * is a unique fixpoint of the updates to U k in Algorithm 1, which suffices to show that U * is indeed val R .
Fig. 2. We set Reach = {s 3 } and Safe = {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 4 }. All states are fully controlled by player R . Both s 1 and s 2 are not part of W S . Hence, U 0 assigns 1 to both states. Since 1 is larger than 0.5, U k+1 still assigns 1 for all k ∈ N with an optimal strategy always preferring move a over move b or any non-Dirac distribution over both. However, the value this strategy yields will effectively be 0 since we never visit a state in Reach.
Theoretical Foundation of Deflating. There are two observations, which are crucial for deflating: (1) A state in an EC cannot have a better reachability value than it achieves by leaving the EC since staying in an EC outside of Reach will effectively yield value 0. (2) The states in the end component may promise each other unsubstantiated overly high reachability values.
Such a problem occurs, for instance, in the EC {s 1 , s 2 } in Fig. 2 . If we initialize all states except s 4 with estimate 1, states s 1 and s 2 will always promise each other value 1 although none of the states can really achieve it.
This process of adjusting the value in ECs is called deflating [16] . In more detail, we will reduce the estimate of the reachability value in end components to the best estimate they can achieve when forced to leave. Here, we define whether a player stays or leaves the end component over its potential successors.
For an end component C and a s ∈ C, we call a move m R ∈ Γ R (s) stay-
One can observe that single moves can be neither staying nor leaving in concurrent games. In turn-based games, the definitions of staying and leaving moves are complementary since each state and thus, every transition, is controlled by a single player.
Example 2. Consider for instance move a at state s 1 for the EC {s 1 , s 2 } in Fig. 3 . Player R can neither enforce to stay in the EC nor can player R enforce to leave it. The state s 5 in Fig. 3 is an example of a state (and an end component), which does not have any move m R for player R such that for all moves m S of player S holds Post(s 5 , m R , m S ) ⊆ {s 5 }. However, the strategy, which assigns probability 1 2 to both available moves ensures that states outside {s 5 } are seen with positive probability.
To overcome this issue, we cannot simply restrict player R to strategies that sign a positive probability to moves, which lead to states outside of the EC with a positive probability since the limit of a sequence of such strategies might not satisfy the property. This is a difficulty for the computation of Pre. Formally, for an EC C, player R and s ∈ C, we denote by
the set of strategies, which force the play to leave C from s, while not using any staying move. Now, we extend the pre-operator as follows:
We denote by best exit(C) (υ)(s) ∈ R exit(C) (s) one optimal strategy of the modified one-shot matrix game, which considers leaving strategies only. Such a strategy exists since we only consider end components not in R or W S and a end component without such a strategy is part of W S . We define the best exit of an end component C for player i with respect to a valuation υ by
Algorithmically Deflating. We finally can devise an algorithm for DEFLATE. First of all, please note that we can compute bestExit υ (C) by removing moves of player R , which surely stay inside the end component, and by constraining the solutions of the linear optimization problem to solve to such solutions assigning a probability greater than 0 to states outside the end component C.
Once we now the best exit of each state, we use the attractor construction to compute the set of states, which can ensure to visit the states with the best exit of an end component C as follows: Please note that we use the computation of the attractor as in [9] . Let B ⊆ C, then
The computation will clearly terminate after at most |C| iterations. Therefore, we set Attr(B) := Attr |C| (B). This corresponds to the set of the states, for which player R surely reaches B.
2 This finally leads to the algorithm for deflating presented in Algorithm 2. DEFLATE first computes the attractor of the best exit, then updates all states in the end component and finally, removes all states from the previously computed attractor. This process is iterated until there is no state left. This intuitively leads to updates from the best to the worst best exit (w.r.t. the current iteration) a player can enforce in state.
Example 3. In Table 1 we apply bounded value iteration on the game in Fig. 1 . We present the lower bound iteration on the left and the upper bound iteration on the right. Since the value of s 0 is irrational, it is not reached within finitely many steps. However, in this example, we need only three steps to approximate it with precision 0.01. Without deflating the upper bound after Iteration 1, the upper bound for s 3 would always be determined by the upper bound of s 0 . Yet, if player R decides to always play a, then staying in the end component {s 3 , s 4 } will yield the value 0. Hence, we must rather take into account the leaving action Algorithm 2 Update upper bound of a single MEC.
until X = ∅ Table 1 . Lower Bound VI on the left and Upper Bound VI on the right for the Game in Fig. 1 , where we approximate the value for state s 0 with decimals.
b from s 3 which yields the true value of 0.4. This reasoning will be more apparent in Example 4, where we also present the respective strategies for player S . Once we have deflated the end component, all values remain constant except for that of s 0 which approaches √ 2 − 1.
Strategy Iteration
In the previous section, we presented an algorithm for VI that can provide both upper and lower bounds on the value, which converge to the actual value, at any point in time. Another popular approach for solving games is SI. So far there is no way of telling how close we have approximated the true value for general concurrent games. For the lower bound, convergence results exist [6] . For the upper bound, however, the only results so far are for the special case of turnbased stochastic games. The problem with convergence of the upper bound is the same as in the case of VI, namely mistakenly overestimating the value within end components and thus not leaving them. We deal with end components by deflating them to a safe over approximation that takes into account leaving strategies.
For SI from below, we iteratively improve a given strategy for player R . Note that for a given ρ ∈ R the value val R :ρ (♦Reach) always provides a lower bound to the true value val R (♦Reach) = sup ρ ′ ∈R val R :ρ ′ (♦Reach). Therefore, it is not clear how to come up with an upper bound, given only a strategy for player R . The key is to consider strategies for player S , as well. Using a similar argument, a fixed strategy σ ∈ S always provides a lower bound val S :σ ( Safe) ≤ sup σ ′ ∈S val S :σ ′ ( Safe) = val S ( Safe). Since val R = 1 − val S , we can compute an upper bound for player R from a lower bound for player S . Taking this discussion into account, the bounded SI algorithm works essentially the same as that for bounded VI.
Algorithm 3 Strategy Iteration for Concurrent Games
Require: concurrent stochastic game G = (S, M, Γ R , Γ S , T) with reach set Reach Output: memoryless strategies ρ, σ 1: Algorithm SI 2:
Compute the set of all MECs M.
4:
Let ρ 0 ∈ R, σ 0 ∈ S be arbitrary memoryless strategies and let k = 0.
5:
7:
10:
14:
Define ρ k+1 as follows for each state s ∈ S:
Define σ k+1 as follows for each state s ∈ S:
The computation of the lower bound in Algorithm 3 corresponds to the standard SI algorithm for which convergence is known [6] . We start with an arbitrary strategy for player R . In the set L k we store the states that currently underestimate the value. For those, we update the strategy such that it optimizes for the current lower bound. The computation of the upper bound is analogous except for the additional call to DEFLATE. Just as in bounded value iteration, DEFLATE reduces the upper bound. For this, it computes the optimal player R strategy (w.r.t the current upper bound) that leaves the end component. Then, the player S strategy is adjusted, to be the best response to such a leaving strategy of player R . We stop whenever one of the sets L k or U k is empty or the difference between the lower and the upper bound is sufficiently small.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm to Deflate the Safety Value in MECs for player S
5:
9:
C := C \ B 10:
until C = ∅ When comparing bounded strategy iteration to bounded value iteration, essentially the only difference is that we keep track of the strategies that are used to attain the current estimate of the respective bounds. Apart from that, most of the computations are analogous to those in BVI. However, note that the computation of U k and L k are quite different in that they are computed as the true reachability value for fixed strategies. In contrast, BVI computes the bounds by means of the Pre-operator. Intuitively, there is not much difference between the two approaches as the Pre-operator computes the true value in the long run. Since we have already proven the correctness of BVI, proving the correctness of BSI amounts to showing that the two really behave the same in the long run, which given the similarities is not too difficult.
The correctness of Algorithm 3 follows the proof of correctness for Algorithm 1 of [6] , which relies on the existence of a matching value iteration algorithm.
Theorem 4.
val( Safe) = val S :σ * ( Safe)
where lim i→∞ σ i = σ * by Algorithm 3.
Proof Sketch. We prove Theorem 4 by an induction over k ∈ N, which shows that 1 − U k ≤ υ k ≤ val( Safe), where the last inequality trivially holds since no strategy can provide a better value than the actual value. For the proof, we use that DEFLATE is monotone and that all updates to σ k just happen to indeed provide the valuation υ k . Since the upper bound is computed as the complement to the safe value, the above theorem implies that the upper bound converges to the true value. Table 2 we show the strategies and corresponding values for both players. The strategies are only given for the states where the choices are non-trivial for the respective player. Since each player has only two actions to choose from, we show the probability assignment for only one of the actions, from which the assignment for the other action is straighforward to compute. Table 2 . Strategy iteration for player R and player S on the top resp bottom. Strategies on the left, corresponding values on the right.
In [5] the authors explain why strategy iteration from below for the safety player does not converge for this game.
3 If player R plays c from s 4 , then for player S it seems as if it did not make a difference whether to play a or b from s 3 as both seem to realize the same value-namely that of s 0 . In fact, the best response for player S at s 3 is to play a in which case player R would attain the value 0 when staying in the end component {s 3 , s 4 }. When computing Pre on the upper bound, this fact is not properly reflected and therefore strategy iteration for the safety player does not converge to the true value at states s 3 and s 4 . In step 0 ′ , we correct this by calling DEFLATE and thus taking into account only exiting strategies from s 4 . Having done so, player S realizes that the reasonable choice at s 3 is to play a rather than b.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have provided the first stopping criterion for both value and strategy iteration on concurrent games with reachability and safety objectives as well as anytime algorithms with the bounds on the current error. Since the games are concurrent and since (ǫ-)optimal strategies may need to be randomized, we could not use the technique of simple end components of [16] . Instead, we iteratively update maximal end components and deflate only those states, which can ensure the currently best exiting combination of moves. We leave an efficient implmentation for future work, as an extension-similarly to [1, 16] 
A Additional Notation
A Markov decision process is a special case of concurrent games such that there exists a p ∈ {R , S } such that for all states s ∈ S holds |Γ p | = 1 and a Markov chain is a special case of SG Markov decision processes where for every i ∈ {R , S } and for every state s holds |Γ i | = 1.
A.1 Generalised Notion of Expected Value
We can compute the expected value for a given valuation υ and strategies π ⊤ and π ⊥ by
υ(s ′ ) denotes the current estimate of the value for state s ′ and it is weighted by the probability to go from state s to state s ′ given the moves m ⊤ and m ⊥ and their probability to be seen under strategies π ⊤ and π ⊥ . This probability is computed by T s,
. Please note that we deliberately avoid fixing players in the definition of the pre-operator Pre. Instead, we associate ⊤ with the player, which tries to maximize the estimate, and ⊥ with the player, which tries to minimize it. For reachability, ⊤ will correspond to player R maximizing the reachability value, while for safety, it will correspond to player S maximizing the safety value. Minimizing and maximizing are added with supremum and infimum computations over all strategies as follows:
Pre ⊤ (υ)(s) = sup
Please note that Π ⊤ denotes the set of all strategies for the maximizing player (and Π ⊥ the set of strategies for the minimizing player). The computation of Pre ⊤ (υ)(s) reduces to the solution of a zero-sum one-shot matrix game and can be solved by linear optimization. Optimal strategies in zero-sum one-shot games need randomisation and we denote the strategy which can achieve the value of Pre ⊤ (υ) by best ⊤ (υ). We give an example of the payoff matrix for a one-shot zero-sum game corresponding to Pre ⊤ (υ)(s) in the next section.
B Correctness Proof for Value Iteration
For this section, we fix a concurrent game G = (S, M, Γ R , Γ S , T). Moreover, we fix the following notation:
i.e. best υ (C) is the set of states in C, which have an exiting strategy yielding the value bestExit υ (C). In order to proof the correctnes of bounded value iteration, it suffices to prove that the sequence U k converges to the actual value because the convergence of L k has already been proven. That is also the reason why we can make use of the following two claims:
-val(♦Reach) is a fixpoint of the operator Pre R , i.e. Pre R (val(♦Reach)) = val(♦Reach) -The operators Pre and Pre R are monotone, which we state in Lemma 5 for simpler usage.
We proceed in to steps. First, we prove that U k converges to a fixpoint. Afterwards, we will show that this fixpoint coincides with the value.
B.1 Convergence to a fixpoint U ⋆
In order to prove the convergence to a fixpoint, we essentially need to show that the sequence is bounded from below and monotonically decreasing. First, we show that U k is indeed an upper bound of the value. The complex part of the proof is the correctness of the DEFLATE. In this procedure, we reduce the upper bounds of some states to the best exit from a subset of states. We start with following lemma, which states that decreasing the value using DEFLATE never decreases the current value below the true value.
Consider the following cases:
First Case: For some s ∈ X there is an optimal strategy ρ ∈ R exit(S ′ ) (s). Then,
Second Case: There exists no s ∈ X with an optimal strategy ρ ∈ qR exit(S ′ ) (s). We distinguish two cases: Case A: Let for all s ∈ X and ρ there is a σ such that Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ S ′ , then due to the maximality of the values for states in X we must also have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ X . Since none of the states chooses a leaving strategy then and S ′ ∩ Reach = ∅, it then holds val(♦Reach)(s) = 0 for all s ∈ X , which is a contradiction to the assumption (especially to S ′ ∩ W S = ∅.
Case B: Let there be a s ∈ X with an optimal strategy ρ, such that for all σ we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ S ′ . Then, there must be moves m R ∈ Supp(ρ(s)) s.t. for all m S we have Post(s, m R , m S ) ⊆ S ′ since we would have ρ ∈ R exit(S ′ ) (s) otherwise, which is not the case by assumption. Let
′ } be a set of moves for player R such that they lead to states in S ′ for all moves of player S . We modify ρ in such a way that moves in M are taken with probability 0:
The strategy ρ ′ is well defined as
Since the value of states in X is maximal among the states in S ′ , the moves in M can yield at most the value of the states in X . Since the remaining moves in Supp(ρ ′ (s)) have been in Supp(ρ(s)) as well and thus, must at least guarantee the same value (we could define a better strategy by choosing only moves in M otherwise), we have Pre R :ρ ′ (val(♦Reach))(s) = Pre R :ρ (val(♦Reach))(s). Therefore, for all states
We first prove that the sequence U k is bounded from below by the true value for states in end components. Later, we also show that is bounded for states that are in no end component at all.
For a valuation υ, denote D i (υ), and D i (C) for the sequences of υ, resp. C during DEFLATE. Then, we denote D |C| (υ) for υ at the end of DEFLATE. The next lemma shows that during no iteration of DEFLATE he current value is deflated below the true value.
Proof. We apply induction over i.
Induction Basis: Let i = 0. Then, D 0 (U)(s) = U(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s) holds by assumption. Induction Hypothesis: For i ≥ 0 and s ∈ C we have D i (U)(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s). Induction
Step: Consider i + 1.
≥ val(♦Reach)(s). The first equality holds because DEFLATE does not affect states outside of D i (C).
Having proven Lemma 2, it is a matter of a simple induction to show the overall boundedness.
Proof. We apply induction over k.
With the induction hypothesis and monotonicty of Pre R the claim follows from Lemma 2.
Now that we have shown that the upper bound is indeed a correct upper bound of the value, we are ready to move our attention to monotonicity. This is one of the most important statements for the correctness and the proof is more involved than those of most of the others, which is the reason why we have split it across several lemmas. The next lemma intuitively shows that deflating is order-preserving in the sense that when applied to two valuations U 1 , U 2 and
. However, we prove a slightly more general version of monotonicity in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Let U 1 , U 2 be two valuations and C an end component such that the following holds:
Proof. Evidently, DEFLATE can only decrease the valuation so D |C| (U 2 ) ≤ U 2 . Hence, it suffices to show that U 2 ≤ D |C| (U 1 ). We show by induction over i that
Base Case:
, then the claim again follows immediately from the induction hypothesis. Case 2: Otherwise, observe that for all s
) due to the above (minimizing) update, but
The step labeled with * holds due to our assumptions as well as the monotonicity of Pre.
Proof. In [6] .
Proof. Induction Basis: k = 0. By definition, we have U 0 (s) = if s ∈ W S then 0 else 1,
i.e. U 0 is equal to 1 everywhere except W S . Since we assume winning to be absorbing, Pre R (U)(s) = 0 for any state s ∈ W S . Since Pre R (U)(s) ≤ 1, this also holds for any best exit. Hence,
On W S , U i is equal to 0 and on Reach to 1 for any i ∈ N.
Case A: s is not contained in any (maximal) end component. Then,
Case B: s ∈ C, for a maximal end component C. Denote U 1 for U k+1 before calling DEFLATE, and likewise let U 2 be the valuation U k+2 before calling DEFLATE. Formally,
. Moreover,
. Thus, the conditions of Lemma 4 hold and we can conclude
.
Finally, we are in the position to show the convergence to a fixpoint. The proof is essentially the same as for Kleene's Fixpoint Theorem. However, our valuations with the partial order ≤ are not a lattice as not every set of valuations has a least element. Hence, we can not simply apply the theorem. Instead, we show that we can argue in a similar way for our setting.
where F denotes the update of U in Algorithm 1.
Proof. Let U := {U k | k ≥ 0}. By Lemma 3 it follows that U is bounded from below by val(♦Reach). Moreover, since F is montone by Lemma 6, there exists inf U = lim k→∞ U k = U ⋆ . Since for any U ∈ U we have inf U ≤ U, due to the monotonicity of F , we also have
In the subsequent proofs we will often implicitly make use of the fact that U ⋆ is a fixpoint.
B.2 Uniqueness of the Fixpoint
The aim of this section is to show that the fixpoint U ⋆ coincides with the true value function. Doing so in absence of end components is fairly straightforward. The DEFLATE procedure deals with the end components by reducing the upper bound in a sound way, as we have proven in the previous section. In order to prove that this fixpoint is equal to the value, we need to establish some further properties about the fixpoint. Intuitively, we expect the claim to hold because all changes of the upper bound are propagated to all states-even those that are in an end component. However, since our DEFLATE procedure might operate on subsets of states that are not end components, we need to show certain properties for general subsets of the state space. The lemmas in this section essentially state that the fixpoint behaves as we expect it to and culminate in Lemma 11. The following lemma is quite natural to expect.
Proof. For all states s ∈ S \ (W S ∪ Reach) we compute U k+1 (s) := Pre R (U k )(s). Depending on whether or not s is in a maximal end component, we do or do not process it further. Consider the cases:
Case A: There is no maximal end component C s.t. s ∈ C. Then, U k+1 (s) = Pre R (U k )(s). Since U ⋆ is a fixpoint (Theorem 5), it must hold that U ⋆ (s) = Pre R (U ⋆ )(s). Case B: Let C ⊆ S be a maximal end component with s ∈ C. Then, we have
The following two lemmas are essentially some technical overhead required to prove Lemma 11, which can be considered the main step in proving the correctness of the fixpoint. All complications stemming from end components arise from overestimating the value within the end component and therefore not taking into account what happens outside of it. With Lemma 11 we show that the fixpoint of our algorithm always takes into account the values of states outside any subset of the states.
Lemma 10. Let S ′ ⊆ C. For every state s ∈ S ′ and every valuation υ, we have
, since every strategy leaving C must also leave S ′ (S ′ ⊆ C), but a strategy leaving S ′ might still lead to states, which are all in C and thus, may not leave C. With the fact that for sets A ⊇ B holds sup A ≥ sup B, the claim follows immediately from the definition of Pre R .
Proof. By Lemma 7 we have
We distinguish the following cases:
First Case: S ′ is not an end component. Then, for all ρ ∈ R and σ ∈ S , there is s ∈ S ′ , such that we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ S ′ . Note we can equivalently say that there exists a state s ∈ S ′ , such that for all strategies ρ ∈ R and σ ∈ S , we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ S ′ .
4
Case A: There exists no (maximal) end component C with s ∈ C. Then
. The first equality holds by the definition of BVI and from the fact that U ⋆ is a fixpoint, and the second equality holds because every strategy is exiting. Case B: Assume that s ∈ C, where C is a maximal end component (i.e.
there exists a maximal end component, which shares some states with
Case B2: Otherwise, there is a strategy ρ, s.t. for all σ we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ Attr(best In both cases, we have Pre We conclude Pre
The last equality follows from the fact that s ′ ∈ Attr(best(D i (C))) and Lemma 8.
Having proven Lemma 11 it is not difficult to establish the main result of this section:
Theorem 6. For s ∈ S have U ⋆ (s) = val(♦Reach)(s).
Proof. Assume there is a state s ∈ S, s.t. ∆(s) := U ⋆ (s)−val(♦Reach)(s) > 0. Let ∆ max := max s∈S ∆(s) and S ′ := {s ∈ S | ∆(s) = ∆ max }. We have Reach ∩ S ′ = ∅ and W S ∩ S ′ = ∅ since the estimates of the reachability probabilities for Reach and W S are correct throughout all iterations (and thus, also in the limit).
From Lemma 11 we obtain a s ∈ S ′ and ρ ∈ R exit(S ′ ) (s) with U ⋆ (s) = Pre R :ρ (U ⋆ )(s). Note that for all σ ∈ S we have Pre ρ,σ (∆)(s) < ∆(s) because for all states s ′ ∈ Post(s, ρ, σ) we have ∆(s ′ ) ≤ ∆(s) and for at least one s ′ ∈ Post(s, ρ, σ) we have ∆(s ′ ) < ∆(s). The former follows from the fact that ∆(s) = ∆ max , and the latter follows from the fact that ρ is an exiting strategy. Hence we have We obtain the inequality U ⋆ (s) < U ⋆ (s) which is a contradiction.
C Correctness Proof for Strategy Iteration
Let G = (S, M, Γ R , Γ S , T) be a concurrent game with reachability objective Reach and safety objective Safe s.t. Safe∪ Reach = S. W.l.o.g., we assume that W S , i.e. the winning region of player S , and Reach are absorbing.
Lemma 12. Let υ be a valuation on S. DEFLATE(1−υ, C) = 1−INFLATE(υ, C) 5 .
Proof. For all states s ∈ C the claim follows since υ(s) remains unchanged (in both algorithms).
In the following, we only consider s ∈ C. For DEFLATE(1−υ, C) and INFLATE(υ, C), the computation of B in every iteration conincides since the computation of the set B is identical. Hence, the claim is proven by Proof. Let s ∈ S. In the following, we use that for the one-shot matrix game Pre ⊤ (υ)(s), we can swap sup and inf. 
